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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Spencer Newell Breese challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. In its brief, the State does not take issue with Mr. Breese’s statement of the
facts or the controlling law, but contends the district court did not err in concluding that
the Greyhound employee who searched Mr. Breese’s backpack was not acting as a
government agent at the time of the search, and that the search was supported by
probable cause and was thus authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement. The cases relied upon by the State do not supports its position
and its argument should be rejected. The district court erred in its legal conclusions and
its decision should be reversed.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Breese relies upon the statement of facts and course of proceedings included
in his opening brief.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Breese’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Mr. Eversull’s Search Of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Implicated Mr. Breese’s Rights
Under The Fourth Amendment Because Mr. Eversull Was Acting As A
Government Agent At The Time Of The Search
In his opening brief, Mr. Breese argued the district court erred in concluding that

Mr. Eversull’s search of his backpack was a private search that did not implicate his
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Mr. Breese

asserted that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of the search
because Corporal Lipple knew of and acquiesced in the search and because
Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement efforts. (App. Br., pp.6-10.) Under
State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512 (Ct. App. 1994), these are the “two critical factors” that a
court must consider in determining whether a person conducting a search is acting as a
government agent. The State agrees that Kopsa provides the proper test, but the State
misreads—and hence, misapplies—that test. Because Corporal Lipple knew of and
acquiesced in the search, and because Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement
efforts, Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent in conducting the search, and
the search thus implicated Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
In its brief, the State asserts:
As noted in Kopsa, “It is firmly established that evidence obtained through
a private search, even though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable
under the fourth amendment unless governmental officials instigated the
search or otherwise participated in a wrongful search.” 126 Idaho at 517,
887 P.2d at 62. Thus, if law enforcement instigates a search or
participates in a wrongful search, a finding that the first factor is satisfied
may be appropriate. Such a finding is not appropriate in this case
because the search of Breese’s bag was neither instigated by Corporal
Lipple nor otherwise wrongful.
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(Resp. Br., p.11.) The Court of Appeals did not hold in Kopsa that law enforcement
must instigate or otherwise participate in a wrongful search in order for that search to
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Court held in Kopsa that in addition to a
situation where a law enforcement officer instigates or otherwise participates in a
wrongful search, the Fourth Amendment is also implicated where a private party acts as
a government agent in conducting a search. The Court first explained:
It is firmly established that evidence obtained through a private search,
even though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable under the fourth
amendment unless government officials instigated the search or otherwise
participated in a wrongful search. However, where a private party acts as
an instrument or agent of the state in effecting a search or seizure, fourth
amendment interests are implicated . . . .
Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517 (citations omitted).

The language quoted by the State

represents the beginning, not the end, of the analysis. The Court went on to explain
that there is a “gray area” between the extremes of overt governmental participation and
the complete absence of such participation. See id.
These “gray area” inquiries can best be resolved on a case-by-case basis,
consistently applying certain principles. One of these principles is that de
minimus or incidental contacts between the citizen and law enforcement
agents prior to or during the course of a search or seizure will not subject
the search to fourth amendment scrutiny. The government must be
involved either directly as a participant or indirectly as an encourager of
the private citizen’s actions in order to bring those actions within the
purview of the fourth amendment. In analyzing whether the person
conducting the search is acting as a government agent, two critical factors
must be considered: (1) government knowledge and acquiescence, and
(2) the private party’s intent in making the search.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The question, then, is not whether Corporal
Lipple instigated or otherwise participated in Mr. Eversull’s search; the question is
whether Corporal Lipple was involved in the search either directly as a participant or
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indirectly as an encourager.

It is clear from considering the two critical factors—

government knowledge and acquiescence and the private party’s intent in making the
search—that Corporal Lipple was involved indirectly as an encourager in the search of
Mr. Breese’s backpack.
1.

Corporal Lipple Knew Of And Acquiesced In The Search Of Mr. Breese’s
Backpack

In his opening brief, Mr. Breese argued that Corporal Lipple knew of and
acquiesced in the search of Mr. Breese’s backpack. In response, the State argues that
“Breese’s argument fails because it is premised upon how the dictionary defines
‘acquiescence’ rather than the meaning behind the word as it is used in the context of
the two-factor test.” (Resp. Br., p.7.) The State reads the term “government knowledge
and acquiescence” as meaning more than the sum of its two parts, but does not cite any
case law or other authority supporting its position. Corporal Lipple knew exactly what
Mr. Eversull was doing as he was doing it, and made no effort to discourage it. This
constitutes knowledge and acquiescence in the context of the two-factor test. See, e.g.,
United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding search of hotel
room “obviously met” the first requirement where, among other things, two police
officers “were personally present during the search, [and] knew exactly what [the hotel
employee] was doing as he was doing it”).
The State argues that any “acquiescence” by Corporal Lipple was “not legally
meaningful” because “Corporal Lipple had no authority to prevent Eversull from doing
precisely what Greyhound policy allowed him to do.” (Resp. Br., p.11.) Mr. Breese
acknowledges that Corporal Lipple could have searched his backpack without a police
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officer present, and that such a search would not have implicated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment. The question here is not one of authority. Instead, the question is
whether Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of the search.
Corporal Lipple’s acquiescence is legally meaningful in resolving this question.
In considering whether the government acquiesced in the search of Mr. Breese’s
backpack, it is significant that this was not a one-time occurrence. Mr. Eversull testified
that when a Greyhound employee suspects illegal substances in checked luggage “[t]he
only thing we do is lock down the buses and call the police, law enforcement.”
(Tr., p.16, Ls.3-7.) When Mr. Eversull was asked if he opened the backpack before
Corporal Lipple arrived, he answered, “No, sir, I do not do that.” (Tr., p.24, Ls.21-23.)
Mr. Eversull testified that he initially requested assistance from Officer Wall, who “has
come in [ ] the past on several drug busts like that, [and] has also come down and done
training with his dog on those buses . . . .” (Tr., p.32, L.24 – p.33, L.5.) The district
court noted it had heard testimony from Mr. Eversull in another case involving the
discovery of an illegal substance in checked luggage on a Greyhound bus. See State v.
Lovely, 159 Idaho 675 (Ct. App. 2016). (R., p.77, n.2.). On these facts, the district
court erred in concluding that the government did not know of and acquiesce in the
search of Mr. Breese’s backpack.
2.

Mr. Eversull Intended To Assist Law Enforcement Efforts In Searching
Mr. Breese’s Backpack

In its brief, the State asserts that “Eversull’s testimony, and the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, supports the conclusion that Eversull’s intent in
searching Breese’s bag was pursuant to Greyhound policy and not for the purpose of
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assisting law enforcement.”

(Resp. Br., p.13.)

Mr. Eversull testified that “as a

Greyhound employee, [he] can search the bag at any time” and that a person who
travels with illegal substances in his checked luggage is “not allowed on Greyhound
property or on buses.”

(Tr., p.16, Ls.3-17; p.31, Ls.16-18.)

But Mr. Eversull also

testified that he wanted a law enforcement officer present when he searched
Mr. Breese’s backpack because he “never know[s] what the quantities are going to be.”
(Tr., p.18, Ls.20-21.) When questioned, Mr. Eversull stated the quantity does not make
a difference to Greyhound, but “would be a difference . . . on what the law enforcement
is going to do with it.” (Tr., p.37, L.23 – p.38, L.3.) It cannot reasonably be disputed
that when Mr. Eversull contacted the Boise Police Department, he intended to assist law
enforcement efforts by identifying an individual whom he believed to be in possession of
an illegal substance. This satisfies the second factor of the two-factor test.
B.

The Search Of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Was Not Authorized Pursuant To The
Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement Because It Was Not
Supported By Probable Cause
In his opening brief, Mr. Breese argued the district court erred in concluding that

the search of his backpack was supported by probable cause. In response, the State
asserts that because the smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause
requirement, citing State v. Gonzales, 117 Idaho 518 (Ct. App. 1990), and because law
enforcement can rely on information provided by citizens for purposes of establishing
probable cause, citing State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961 (Ct. App. 2004), the smell of
marijuana by a citizen can establish probable cause. (Resp. Br., p.16.) The State’s
argument is not supported by Gonzales and Van Dorne.
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In Gonzales, the Court of Appeals held that probable cause for a search exists
where a trained officer detects the smell of marijuana. 117 Idaho at 519. The Court did
not hold that probable cause for a search exists where an individual who is not a trained
officer detects the smell of marijuana. In Van Dorne, the Court of Appeals held that
under the collective knowledge doctrine, information obtained from a citizen can be
imputed to an officer for purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion. 139 Idaho at
965. The Court did not hold that an officer can rely on information obtained from a
citizen (in this case, the odor of marijuana) where the information is dispelled by the
officer’s own observations (in this case, a failure to detect an odor of marijuana). What
we have here is not collective knowledge, but contradicted knowledge.
The State also contends that “[i]f Eversull’s acts are going to be attributable to
law enforcement, his experience in detecting marijuana should be as well.” (Resp.
Br., p.16.) The State does not cite any authority in support of this proposition. The fact
that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent in searching Mr. Breese’s backpack
does not mean that Mr. Eversull was in fact a government agent for all purposes.
Mr. Eversull could not have placed Mr. Breese under arrest, or given him the warnings
required pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The two inquiries—
whether Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent and, if so, whether the search
of Mr. Breese’s backpack was supported by probable cause—are factually and legally
distinct.

Looking at the second inquiry, the totality of the circumstances known to

Corporal Lipple at the time of the search, including the fact that he did not smell
marijuana emanating from Mr. Breese’s backpack, would not give rise in the mind of a
reasonable person to a fair probability that contraband would be found in that backpack.
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This is the test for probable cause, see State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012),
and it is not satisfied here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief,
Mr. Breese respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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